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NOTE
Toward a Child-Centered Approach to Evaluating
Claims of Alienation in High-Conflict
Custody Disputes
Allison M. Nichols*
Theories of parental alienation abound in high-conflict custody cases. The im-
age of one parent brainwashing a child against the other parent fits with what
we think we know about family dynamics during divorce. The concept of a
diagnosable “Parental Alienation Syndrome” (“PAS”) developed as an at-
tempt to explain this phenomenon, but it has been widely discredited by
mental health professionals and thus fails the standard for evidentiary admis-
sibility. Nevertheless, PAS and related theories continue to influence the deci-
sions of family courts, and even in jurisdictions that explicitly reject such
theories, judges still face the daunting task of resolving these volatile cases. In
the midst of this highly adversarial process, children deserve independent rep-
resentation to ensure that their interests remain front and center. Mandating
the appointment of guardians ad litem in cases involving allegations of abuse
or alienation will assist courts in conducting individualized, fact-specific in-
vestigations into such allegations to craft custody orders that serve the best
interests of children.
Table of Contents
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 664
I. The Evidentiary Admissibility of PAS Testimony . . . . . . . . . 666
A. The “Syndrome” and Its Controversy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 666
B. The Daubert–Frye Divide: From
General Acceptance to Reliability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 669
C. Inadmissible Under Either Standard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 671
1. Not Generally Accepted Under Frye . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 671
2. Insufficiently Reliable Under Daubert . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 673
II. Refocusing the Dispute: The Role of the
Guardian Ad Litem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 679
A. The Need for Independent Representation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 680
B. Proposed Statutory Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 682
C. Critiques and a Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 684
III. GALs in Action: Sample Scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 686
Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 688
* J.D., May 2013, University of Michigan Law School. Many thanks to my editors, Becca
Klein, Maggie Mettler, Stephen Mayer, and Robbie Manhas, and to the rest of the MLR Notes
Office for their support. I am grateful to Professor Joshua Kay for his valuable feedback and
mentorship, and to Professor Kathleen Coulborn Faller for inspiring my interest in this field.
663
664 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 112:663
Introduction
Sixty-five percent of divorces in the United States involve families with
minor children,1 affecting about one million children per year.2 Most cus-
tody arrangements in these cases are settled privately or through mediation,
but 10 percent proceed to litigation before family courts.3 Due to the adver-
sarial nature of the court system and the intensely emotional nature of di-
vorce, child custody battles can turn vicious, and some experts argue that
divorce may be “the single most traumatic experience” of a child’s life, with
the potential to cause long-term psychological damage.4 High-conflict cus-
tody cases are more likely to involve allegations of child abuse or domestic
violence,5 and even when that is not the case, children can be used as pawns
in a struggle between warring parents. Popular culture is filled with stories
of parents brainwashing their children in an attempt to manipulate the legal
system for their own personal gain. In particular, the image of the scorned
and vindictive mother, one who will do anything to prevent her children
from seeing their father, has become an all-too-familiar archetype.
Child psychiatrist Richard Gardner coined the term “Parental Alienation
Syndrome” (“PAS”) in 1985 to describe the breakdown of a parent–child
relationship during high-conflict custody disputes.6 According to Gardner,
The parental alienation syndrome (PAS) is a childhood disorder that arises
almost exclusively in the context of child-custody disputes. Its primary
manifestation is the child’s campaign of denigration against a parent, a
campaign that has no justification. It results from the combination of a
1. Kathleen Coulborn Faller, Essay, Child Maltreatment and Endangerment in the Con-
text of Divorce, 22 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 429, 429 (2000).
2. George J. Cohen, Comm. on Psychosocial Aspects of Child & Family Health, Helping
Children and Families Deal with Divorce and Separation, 110 Pediatrics 1019, 1019 (2002).
3. Stephanie J. Dallam & Joyanna L. Silberg, Myths That Place Children at Risk During
Custody Disputes, 9 Sexual Assault Rep. 33, 33 (2006), available at http://www.leadership
council.org/docs/Dallam&Silberg.pdf.
4. Faller, supra note 1, at 429.
5. See Dallam & Silberg, supra note 3. One panel of experts defines the concept of
“high-conflict” custody disputes as follows:
High-conflict custody cases are marked by a lack of trust between the parents, a high level
of anger and a willingness to engage in repetitive litigation. . . . High conflict cases can
arise when parents, attorneys or mental health professionals become invested in the con-
flict or when parents are in a dysfunctional relationship, have mental disorders, are en-
gaged in criminal or quasi-criminal conduct, substance abuse or there are allegations of
domestic violence, or child abuse or neglect.
High-Conflict Custody Cases: Reforming the System for Children—Conference Report and Action
Plan, 34 Fam. L.Q. 589, 590 (2001), quoted in Linda D. Elrod, Reforming the System to Protect
Children in High Conflict Custody Cases, 28 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 495, 500 (2001).
6. Richard A. Gardner, Recent Trends in Divorce and Custody Litigation, Acad. F., Sum-
mer 1985, at 3, 3. For a general critique of Gardner’s methods and views, see, for example,
Joan S. Meier, A Historical Perspective on Parental Alienation Syndrome and Parental Alienation,
6 J. Child Custody 232, 237–38 (2009).
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programming (brainwashing) parent’s indoctrinations and the child’s own
contributions to the vilification of the target parent.7
Gardner claims that this behavior deserves classification as a psychologi-
cal syndrome due to a cluster of eight proposed symptoms, which he has
identified through his clinical experience counseling parents and children
during divorce and custody proceedings.8 Gardner’s conception of PAS at-
tempts to explain the increased incidence of child sexual abuse allegations
beginning in the 1980s. Gardner argues that a vindictive parent frequently
uses intentionally false allegations of child abuse—particularly sexual
abuse—as an “extremely effective weapon” to turn a child against the other
parent and thereby gain sole custody.9 This characterization of family dy-
namics during divorce has prompted harsh criticism from psychologists, le-
gal scholars, and domestic violence survivors’ and children’s advocates alike,
yet Gardner’s theory has gained some traction (as well as significant atten-
tion) in family courts since its inception thirty years ago.10
The controversy surrounding allegations of parental alienation is mul-
tifaceted. On the one hand, various debunked mental health theories con-
tinue to exert inappropriate influence over the decisions of family courts. Yet
the problem is certainly not confined to this issue, and once we look beyond
admissibility concerns, there are few clear rules to guide family court judges
in divining the best interests of a child who rejects a parent. Fortunately,
judges do not have to issue orders while blindfolded; guardians ad litem
serve a crucial function in fact-finding for the court, as well as providing
independent representation for the child. Part I of this Note addresses the
admissibility issue and concludes that testimony regarding PAS and related
theories is inadmissible under the relevant evidentiary standards. Part II rec-
ommends that states adopt legislation requiring the appointment of guardi-
ans ad litem in all contested custody cases involving allegations of abuse,
domestic violence, or alienation to assist courts in grappling with the com-
plex legal and factual issues that these cases pose. Finally, Part III offers
7. Richard A. Gardner, Parental Alienation Syndrome vs. Parental Alienation: Which Di-
agnosis Should Evaluators Use in Child-Custody Disputes?, 30 Am. J. Fam. Therapy 93, 95
(2002) [hereinafter Gardner, PAS vs. Parental Alienation]; see also Richard A. Gardner, The
Parental Alienation Syndrome: A Guide for Mental Health and Legal Professionals
73–74 (2d ed. 1998) [hereinafter Gardner, PAS Guide] (“The disorder refers to a situation in
which the parental programming is combined with the child’s own scenarios of denigration of
the allegedly hated parent.”).
8. These symptoms include (1) “a campaign of denigration” by the child; (2) “[w]eak,
absurd, or frivolous rationalizations for the deprecation”; (3) a “lack of ambivalence” in hostil-
ity; (4) “the ‘independent-thinker’ phenomenon”; (5) “[r]eflexive support” of the favored par-
ent; (6) a lack of guilt over behavior toward the target parent; (7) recounting “borrowed
scenarios” as justification for the hostility; and (8) a “[s]pread of the animosity” to the ex-
tended family and friends of the target parent. Gardner, PAS vs. Parental Alienation, supra note
7, at 97; see also Gardner PAS Guide, supra note 7, at 76–109.
9. Gardner, PAS vs. Parental Alienation, supra note 7, at 106.
10. See infra Section I.A.
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several examples of ways in which guardians ad litem can promote outcomes
that serve the best interests of children.
I. The Evidentiary Admissibility of PAS Testimony
State law governs the admissibility of expert witness testimony in child
custody cases,11 but most states have adopted one of two rules set forth in
cases interpreting the federal standards for admissibility. Nine states and the
District of Columbia follow the Frye rule, while thirty-four states adhere to
the more recent Daubert standard.12 The remaining seven states use their
own unique approaches.13 Section I.A outlines the criticisms of PAS as a
scientific theory. Section I.B traces the evolution of the Frye and Daubert
standards for the admissibility of expert witness testimony. Section I.C ap-
plies each standard to PAS testimony and concludes that such evidence is
inadmissible under either standard.
A. The “Syndrome” and Its Controversy
Since its inception nearly thirty years ago, the idea of a parental aliena-
tion “syndrome” as a diagnosable, pathological condition has provoked
harsh reactions from critics for various reasons. Gardner based the theory of
PAS in part on his belief that false allegations of child sexual abuse are ram-
pant in high-conflict custody battles,14 but many professionals believe that
false abuse allegations in custody disputes are actually rare.15 One frequently
cited study examined 9,000 contested custody cases and identified only 2%
involving allegations of sexual abuse, of which half were substantiated.16 In
other words, at most, only 1% of the custody cases involved false allegations
of child sexual abuse, and it is unclear how many of these were intentionally
false as opposed to false allegations made in good faith. Other studies have
found that child sexual abuse claims were validated in a significant majority
of cases.17
11. State rules of evidence apply, as state courts initially handle custody disputes.
12. Maggie Tamburro, Daubert, Frye . . . or Both? Tracking Florida’s Buy-In, BullsEye
(Mar. 12, 2012), http://www.ims-expertservices.com/blog/2012/daubert-frye-or-both/; see also
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993); Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013
(D.C. Cir. 1923), superseded by rule, Fed. R. Evid. 702, as recognized in Daubert, 509 U.S. at
588–89.
13. Tamburro, supra note 12.
14. Meier, supra note 6, at 237.
15. See, e.g., Nicholas Bala & John Schuman, Allegations of Sexual Abuse When Parents
Have Separated, 17 Canadian Fam. L.Q. 191, 199 (2000); Meier, supra note 6, at 237.
16. Nancy Thoennes & Patricia G. Tjaden, The Extent, Nature, and Validity of Sexual
Abuse Allegations in Custody/Visitation Disputes, 14 Child Abuse & Neglect 151, 160–61
(1990), cited in Meier, supra note 6, at 237.
17. Kathleen Coulborn Faller, The Parental Alienation Syndrome: What Is It and What
Data Support It?, 3 Child Maltreatment 100, 107 (1998) (summarizing the findings of nu-
merous studies and focusing on two studies that found that about 70% of sexual abuse allega-
tions in custody disputes were “likely”); cf. Bala & Schuman, supra note 15, at 196–97 (citing a
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Gardner’s theory has also faced sharp criticism from women’s advo-
cates. On its face, the current formulation of PAS and its symptoms appears
gender neutral, but Gardner originally claimed that custodial mothers were
responsible for causing up to 90% of PAS cases.18 As recently as 2002, Gard-
ner wrote that alleging child sexual abuse “is probably one of the most pow-
erful vengeance maneuvers ever utilized by a woman whose husband has left
her.”19 In another work, he repeatedly characterized mothers as vindictive
and irate, adding that “[some feminists] have jumped on the sex abuse
bandwagon because it provides a predictable vehicle for venting hostility
toward men.”20 Empirical research, however, refutes this characterization of
vindictive mothers.21 A 1998 Canadian study revealed that custodial parents
(usually mothers) are in fact least likely to make intentionally false allega-
tions of child abuse or neglect, while noncustodial parents and other rela-
tives or acquaintances are responsible for the majority of intentionally false
reports.22
Moreover, domestic violence survivors’ and children’s advocates argue
that Gardner’s theory obscures legitimate sources of estrangement between
parents and children, such as abuse, neglect, or even a child’s sense of aban-
donment caused by divorce itself. In the words of one family law expert,
“Gardner confounds a child’s developmentally related reaction to divorce
and high parental conflict (including violence) with psychosis.”23 These ad-
vocates fear that allowing “diagnoses” of PAS to influence the resolution of
custody cases could result in courts placing children with their abusers.24
Gardner and his supporters have maintained that a diagnosis of PAS is only
study that found that only 1.3% of physical and sexual abuse allegations made by custodial
mothers and 21% of those made by noncustodial fathers were intentionally false).
18. See Gardner, PAS vs. Parental Alienation, supra note 7, at 105. He later revised this
estimate to 50%, apparently to reflect the greater number of custodial fathers with increased
opportunity to induce PAS. See id. at 105.
19. Id. at 106.
20. Richard A. Gardner, Sex Abuse Hysteria 24, 87 (1991); see also Michele A.
Adams, Framing Contests in Child Custody Disputes: Parental Alienation Syndrome, Child Abuse,
Gender, and Fathers’ Rights, 40 Fam. L.Q. 315, 330–31 (2006).
21. See Joan S. Meier, Parental Alienation Syndrome and Parental Alienation: Research
Reviews, VAWnet.org, 3 (Jan. 2009), http://www.vawnet.org/Assoc_Files_VAWnet/AR_PAS.
pdf.
22. See id. The researchers found that 12% of child abuse or neglect allegations made
during contested custody cases were false. Custodial parents accounted for 14% of those re-
ports. By contrast, noncustodial parents (usually fathers) made 43% of the deliberately false
reports, and 19% came from other relatives, neighbors, or acquaintances. Id.
23. Carol S. Bruch, Parental Alienation Syndrome and Parental Alienation: Getting It
Wrong in Child Custody Cases, 35 Fam. L.Q. 527, 530 (2001) (footnote omitted).
24. See, e.g., Joan S. Meier, Domestic Violence, Child Custody, and Child Protection: Un-
derstanding Judicial Resistance and Imagining the Solutions, 11 Am. U. J. Gender Soc. Pol’y &
Law 657, 679–80 (2003); see also Stephanie Dallam, Are “Good Enough” Parents Losing Custody
to Abusive Ex-Partners?, Leadership Council on Child Abuse & Interpersonal Violence
(2008), http://www.leadershipcouncil.org/1/pas/dv.html (summarizing empirical research and
reports indicating that “too often custody decisions are based on bad science, misinterpreta-
tion of fact, and evaluator bias”).
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appropriate in cases of false allegations of abuse; in other words, if there is
abuse, there can be no PAS.25 But given the point–counterpoint nature of
custody cases—abuse allegation by one parent quickly countered by PAS
allegation by the other—“application of ‘parental alienation syndrome’ . . .
in cases with abuse allegations[ ] seems intrinsically to deny the likelihood
that some children appropriately want and need their exposure to [abusive
parents] . . . to be limited.”26
Perhaps in part due to the controversy surrounding PAS, some of the
theory’s supporters have shifted to using the term “Parental Alienation Dis-
order” (“PAD”) to describe the same phenomenon.27 The proposed diagnos-
tic criteria for PAD are virtually identical to those outlined in Gardner’s PAS
framework.28 Similarly, many cases, courts, and custody evaluators refer to
the more generic-sounding “parental alienation” instead.29 Gardner himself
distinguished “parental alienation” from PAS by defining the former as “the
wide variety of symptoms that may result from or be associated with a
child’s alienation from a parent,” with potential causes including but not
limited to physical or emotional abuse, abandonment, ongoing acrimony
within the family, impaired parenting, or denunciations by one parent to-
ward the other.30 Other experts, however, use the terms virtually inter-
changeably.31 Many attorneys and judges have likewise adopted this last
approach.32 Regardless of the precise terminology used, the claim that one
25. Richard A. Gardner, Differentiating Between Parental Alienation Syndrome and Bona
Fide Abuse–Neglect, 27 Am. J. Fam. Therapy 97, 97 (1999).
26. Meier, supra note 24, at 679–80.
27. See Timothy M. Houchin et al., The Parental Alienation Debate Belongs in the Court-
room, Not in DSM-5, 40 J. Am. Acad. Psychiatry & Law 127, 127 (2012) (“[R]ecently, paren-
tal alienation supporters have renamed PAS as PAD . . . .”). In this context, the distinction
between “syndrome” and “disorder” is merely semantic. See id.
28. See Lenore E. Walker & David L. Shapiro, Parental Alienation Disorder: Why Label
Children with a Mental Diagnosis?, 7 J. Child Custody 266, 267–68, 275–76 (2010).
29. See, e.g., Sueiro v. Gallardo, 105 So. 3d 585, 587–88 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012) (hold-
ing that the mother did not engage in “parental alienation”); Rooney v. Rooney, No.
2009CA00256, 2010-Ohio-2439, at ¶¶ 8–11, 2010 WL 2186026, at *2–3 (Ohio Ct. App. June 1,
2010) (discussing experts’ opinions that the mother engaged in “parental alienation”); Saleh v.
Parsadmehr, No. 49859-2-I, 2003 WL 21321829, at *4 (Wash. Ct. App. June 9, 2003) (unpub-
lished opinion) (noting that the father engaged in “parental alienation” and failed to partici-
pate in “parental-alienation counseling” as ordered).
30. Gardner, PAS vs. Parental Alienation, supra note 7, at 94–95.
31. Id. at 98 (rejecting this conflation). This Note uses the term “parental alienation
syndrome” or “PAS” to refer to any theory of alienation that purports to diagnose a child with
a mental health condition that is caused by one parent’s interference in the relationship be-
tween the child and the other parent. This Note uses the terms “alienation” and “estrange-
ment” to refer to the experience of a breakdown in the relationship between parent and child,
regardless of its cause.
32. See, e.g., Bond v. MacLeod, 921 N.Y.S. 2d 671, 673–74 (N.Y. App. Div. 2011) (refer-
ring to “parental alienation” but describing estrangement provoked by the father); Buxton v.
Storm (In re Custody of D.T.J.S.–B), 238 P.3d 30, 36 (Or. Ct. App. 2010) (describing behavior
that was indicative of possible alienation without characterizing the behavior as a syndrome or
a disorder); see also In re Karen “PP” v. Clyde “QQ,” 602 N.Y.S.2d 709 (App. Div. 1993)
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parent has intentionally alienated a child from the other parent continues to
influence the decisions of family court judges.33 The influence of inappropri-
ate expert witness testimony exacerbates this problem.
B. The Daubert–Frye Divide: From General Acceptance to Reliability
For seventy years, the D.C. Circuit’s ruling in Frye v. United States gov-
erned the admissibility of expert witness testimony in federal courts.34 The
court held in Frye that the basis for an expert opinion must hold “general
acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs” for testimony on the
subject to pass the standard for admissibility.35 The purpose of the Frye test
was to ensure that courts enter into evidence only objectively valid scientific
testimony. The decision recognized that although opposing parties hire ex-
pert witnesses in many cases, “a scientist who becomes the alter ego of a
lawyer is no longer a scientist.”36 Experts are meant to provide information
and draw inferences that would otherwise remain beyond the competence of
the trier of fact. They are not meant to serve as “hired guns.”37 Thus, by
requiring expert testimony to be generally accepted within the relevant field,
courts could exclude truly partisan and potentially misleading testimony.
Nonetheless, the general acceptance requirement could also lead to the ex-
clusion of relevant, probative evidence, such as information derived from
cutting-edge technologies or theories.
The general acceptance test served as the prevailing standard for deter-
mining the admissibility of scientific evidence until the Supreme Court’s
decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.38 In resolving a cir-
cuit split, the Court held that the Federal Rules of Evidence superseded the
(affirming that “programm[ing]” had occurred, despite family court’s reliance on a book
about PAS that had not been entered into evidence or referenced by any witnesses), aff’g In re
Karen B. v. Clyde M., 574 N.Y.S.2d 267 (Fam. Ct. 1991).
33. See, e.g., In re Miller, 20 A.3d 854, 864 (N.H. 2011) (citing the Vermont Supreme
Court for its refusal to “condone[ ] a parent’s willful alienation of a child from the other
parent” (quoting Begins v. Begins, 721 A.2d 469, 472 (Vt. 1998))); Bond, 921 N.Y.S.2d at 674
(relying on the family court’s finding that “some degree of parental alienation by the father
had occurred”); Woodward v. Woodward, 776 N.W.2d 567, 571 (N.D. 2009) (affirming the
trial court’s order requiring the mother to undergo a parental alienation evaluation); Buxton,
238 P.3d at 36 (noting the psychologist’s testimony that the child’s behavior indicated aliena-
tion and granting custody to the target parent).
34. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923), superseded by rule, Fed. R. Evid. 702, as recognized in
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 588–89 (1993).
35. Frye, 293 F. at 1014.
36. Henry F. Fradella et al., The Impact of Daubert on the Admissibility of Behavioral
Science Testimony, 30 Pepp. L. Rev. 403, 406 (2003) (quoting Peter Huber, Junk Science in the
Courtroom, 26 Val. U. L. Rev. 723, 742 (1992)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
37. Id.
38. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
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Frye standard.39 It rejected the notion that Rule 702 incorporated Frye,40 not-
ing that “a rigid ‘general acceptance’ requirement would be at odds with the
‘liberal thrust’ of the Federal Rules.”41 The Court then interpreted Rule 702
to clarify the standard for admissibility of expert testimony. It concluded
that trial judges serve as gatekeepers for evidentiary matters, responsible for
ensuring that expert testimony is both reliable and relevant to the question
at issue.42 Once a court qualified a witness as an expert, Daubert outlined
four factors for trial courts to consider in determining whether scientific
evidence is reliable: (1) whether the theory or technique “can be (and has
been) tested”; (2) whether the theory or technique “has been subjected to
peer review and publication”; (3) whether “the known or potential rate of
error” is acceptable; and (4) whether the theory or technique has gained
“[w]idespread acceptance.”43
The Daubert Court also addressed two concerns regarding the standard
for admission of expert testimony. First, it rejected the respondent’s argu-
ment that abandoning the general acceptance standard would lead to a
“ ‘free-for-all’ in which befuddled juries are confounded by absurd and irra-
tional pseudoscientific assertions.”44 The Court concluded that cross-exami-
nation, presentation of contrary evidence, jury instructions on the burden
of proof, and, if necessary, summary judgment or directed verdicts are the
appropriate means to balance the weight ultimately afforded to questionable
scientific evidence that is nevertheless admissible under Rule 702.45 Second,
the Court addressed the opposing concern—that the Daubert gatekeeping
39. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 585, 587. The Federal Rules of Evidence were originally
adopted in 1975, more than fifty years after the D.C. Circuit decided Frye.
40. Fed. R. Evid. 702 (1975) (amended 2000 and 2011). The 2000 amendment to Rule
702 added a nonexclusive list of factors to consider in determining the reliability of expert
testimony; however, there are no substantive differences between the original and amended
versions of the Rule for the purposes of this Note’s analysis. The 2011 amendment was limited
to stylistic changes.
41. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 588–89 (quoting Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153,
169 (1988)).
42. See id. at 589–92. The Court arrived at this conclusion by parsing the language of
Rule 702. The original version of the Rule required that expert testimony be based on scientific
knowledge, which the Court interpreted as establishing a standard of “evidentiary reliability.”
Id. at 589–90. Rule 702 also required that the proffered evidence “assist the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue,” Fed. R. Evid. 702 (1975) (amended
2000 and 2011), which the Court determined referred to the requisite relevance of the evi-
dence. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 591.
43. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592–94. The Court included the caveat that these factors are
“general observations,” not a “definitive checklist.” Id. at 593. The Court extended its Daubert
holding to all expert testimony involving scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge
in Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999). The Kumho Tire Court based its holding
in part on the fact that the language of Rule 702 does not distinguish between scientific and
other forms of expert testimony, and it found no convincing need to create such a distinction.
Id. at 147–50. Thus, the Daubert standard now applies to testimony from experts in the social
and behavioral sciences, including psychiatrists and psychologists.
44. Daubert, 590 U.S. at 595–96.
45. Id.
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scheme would limit the admissibility of scientific evidence too severely by
excluding testimony based on innovative theories or techniques. Writing for
the majority, Justice Blackmun reasoned that “there are important differ-
ences between the quest for truth in the courtroom and the quest for truth
in the laboratory.”46 He noted that the scientific process of hypothesis and
experimentation does not always lend itself easily to the legal task of issuing
efficient and binding judgments and that any sort of admissibility standard
may occasionally exclude scientific evidence that later proves to be valid or
even determinative.47 Nevertheless, he determined that “the balance that is
struck by [the] Rules of Evidence [is] designed not for the exhaustive search
for cosmic understanding but for the particularized resolution of legal
disputes.”48
C. Inadmissible Under Either Standard
This Section examines expert testimony regarding PAS under both Frye
and Daubert. It concludes that such testimony is inadmissible under either
standard because it is neither generally accepted within the mental health
field nor supported by reliable empirical evidence.
1. Not Generally Accepted Under Frye
For the ten jurisdictions that adhere to the Frye regime,49 the relevant
standard for admissibility asks whether the basis for the expert’s testimony is
generally accepted by the particular field to which it belongs. Frye did not
provide guidance on how courts should define a “particular field,” nor did it
indicate what level of agreement is necessary to constitute general accept-
ance.50 In considering the latter question, one federal district court looked to
the plain meaning of the word “general” and concluded that such agreement
must be “common to many, or the greatest number; widespread; prevalent;
extensive though not universal.”51 Another federal court held that a “sub-
stantial section of the scientific community concerned” must recognize the
method or procedure.52 Finally, a state supreme court noted that “the issue
46. Id. at 596–97.
47. Id. at 597.
48. Id.
49. Namely, California, Florida, Illinois, Kansas, Maryland, Minnesota, New York,
Pennsylvania, and Washington, plus the District of Columbia. Tamburro, supra note 12.
50. See generally supra note 35 and accompanying text. For the purposes of this analysis,
this Note defines the “field” in broad strokes as American mental health professionals, includ-
ing psychiatrists, clinical psychologists, and clinical social workers.
51. United States v. Zeiger, 350 F. Supp. 685, 688 (D.D.C. 1972) (quoting Platt v. Craig,
63 N.E. 594, 595 (Ohio 1902)) (internal quotation marks omitted), rev’d 475 F.2d 1280 (D.C.
Cir. 1972).
52. United States v. Williams, 443 F. Supp. 269, 273 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
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is consensus versus controversy over a particular technique,” and “[a] tech-
nique . . . is not ‘generally accepted’ if it is experimental or of dubious
validity.”53
Regardless of precisely how courts define these terms, PAS cannot be
considered generally accepted, and it is therefore inadmissible under Frye.
Theories of parental alienation—especially the concept of a diagnosable pa-
rental alienation syndrome or disorder—are highly controversial among
mental health professionals and commentators.54 A former president of the
American Psychiatric Association described PAS as “junk science,”55 and the
American Psychological Association highlighted the lack of data supporting
the “so-called ‘parental alienation syndrome’ ”56 while cautioning its mem-
bers about the ethical implications of using unproven diagnoses in their
practices.57
Most recently, the American Psychiatric Association declined to include
PAD in the fifth and latest edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of
Mental Disorders (“DSM”).58 The DSM, sometimes called the “bible of psy-
chiatry,” serves as the primary diagnostic manual for mental health profes-
sionals and includes every psychiatric disorder recognized by the field.59 The
previous edition of the DSM, released in 1994, did not directly confront the
53. Donaldson v. Cent. Ill. Pub. Serv. Co., 767 N.E.2d 314, 324 (Ill. 2002), abrogated by
In re Commitment of Simons, 621 N.E.2d 1184 (Ill. 2004).
54. See, e.g., Adams, supra note 20, at 327–32 (discounting the “scorned woman” stere-
otype underlying PAS); Faller, supra note 17, at 111 (concluding that PAS must be classified as
a nondiagnostic syndrome that cannot be used to determine whether a child has been abused);
Barbara Jo Fidler & Nicholas Bala, Children Resisting Postseparation Contact with a Parent:
Concepts, Controversies, and Conundrums, 48 Fam. Ct. Rev. 10, 13 (2010) (noting the contro-
versy among mental health professionals regarding the validity of PAS as a diagnosis); Janet R.
Johnston, Children of Divorce Who Reject a Parent and Refuse Visitation: Recent Research and
Social Policy Implications for the Alienated Child, 38 Fam. L.Q. 757, 758 (2005) (referencing the
“ideological battle” surrounding PAS and calling for a reformulation of the concept of
alienation).
55. See Jamie Talan, The Debate Rages on . . . In Death, Can He Survive?, Leadership
Council on Child Abuse & Interpersonal Violence (July 1, 2003), http://www.leader-
shipcouncil.org/1/pas/talan.html.
56. Statement on Parental Alienation Syndrome, Am. Psychol. Ass’n (Jan. 1, 2008),
http://www.apa.org/news/press/releases/2008/01/pas-syndrome.aspx (noting that the Ameri-
can Psychological Association currently has “no official position on the purported
syndrome”).
57. See Walker & Shapiro, supra note 28, at 276.
58. David Crary, Parental Alienation Not on List of Disorders, Washington Times
(Sept. 23, 2012), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/sep/23/parental-alienation-not-
on-list-of-disorders/?page=1; see also American Psychiatric Ass’n, Diagnostic and Statis-
tical Manual of Mental Disorders (5th ed. 2013) [hereinafter DSM-V]. The vice chair-
man of the drafting task force for the fifth edition of the DSM explained that parental
alienation is “a relationship problem—parent–child or parent–parent. Relationship problems
per se are not mental disorders.” Crary, supra (internal quotation marks omitted).
59. The American Psychiatric Association defines this field as “the U.S. healthcare sys-
tem.” See About DSM-5, Am. Psychiatric Ass’n, http://www.dsm5.org/about/Pages/Default.
aspx (last visited Oct. 4, 2013).
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issue of whether to include a diagnosable condition of parental alienation.60
Thus, the American Psychiatric Association’s rejection of the proposed dis-
order—especially in light of the most intense lobbying campaign conducted
for any diagnosis proposed for the new edition61—perceptibly strengthens
the argument that PAS and PAD are not generally accepted within the Amer-
ican medical community.62
A proponent of expert witness testimony bears the burden of proving its
admissibility, meaning that under the Frye standard, the proponent must
demonstrate that mental health professionals generally accept his witness’s
reliance on the PAS (or PAD) pathology. At the very least, the American
Psychiatric Association’s explicit rejection of PAD, in light of the significant
lobbying effort by some professionals advocating its acceptance, indicates a
lack of consensus; at most, the rejection demonstrates that the debate is
settled, and PAD is not generally accepted in the field of psychiatry. Regard-
less which of these is true, the proponent of such testimony will be unable to
meet the Frye standard, and a court should rule the evidence inadmissible.
2. Insufficiently Reliable Under Daubert
The Daubert Court identified a nonexhaustive list of factors to consider
in determining whether proposed expert witness testimony is sufficiently re-
liable to be admitted into evidence. As one of the four factors it high-
lighted,63 the Daubert Court described widespread acceptance as
incorporating the same considerations previously articulated in Frye,64 and
60. Cf. Crary, supra note 58.
61. See Houchin, supra note 27, at 127.
62. Notably, the National Institute of Mental Health, a federal agency dedicated to re-
search on mental illnesses, recently called into question the validity of the DSM. The Institute’s
director, Dr. Insel, distinguished between the DSM’s usefulness as a “clinical tool” and its
ability to guide research on complex mental disorders that may “cut across” the manual’s
diagnostic categories. Pam Belluck & Benedict Carey, Psychiatry’s New Guide Falls Short, Ex-
perts Say, N.Y. Times (May 7, 2013), at A13, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/07/
health/psychiatrys-new-guide-falls-short-experts-say.html?partner=rss&emc=rss&_r=2&. This
criticism does not undermine the American Psychiatric Association’s decision to exclude PAD
from the latest edition of the DSM, which remains the central authority for recognized psychi-
atric conditions. But it does highlight disagreement within the field over the distinction be-
tween recognition (or rejection) by the DSM and the validity of underlying research
methodologies.
63. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592–94 (1993); see also supra
text accompanying note 43. Subsequent cases have also considered factors such as whether the
expert accounted for alternative explanations for a phenomenon. See, e.g., Claar v. Burlington
N. R.R. Co., 29 F.3d 499, 502 (9th Cir. 1994) (excluding testimony where the expert did not
account for other, obvious potential causes for the plaintiff’s injury). But see Ambrosini v.
Labarraque, 101 F.3d 129, 140 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (characterizing this issue as a question of
weight, rather than admissibility). Other courts have considered whether the methodology
underlying the testimony is scientifically valid. See, e.g., Moore v. Ashland Chem. Inc., 151
F.3d 269 (5th Cir. 1998) (excluding testimony where the expert’s opinion was not grounded in
independently validated scientific methodology).
64. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 585–89, 594 (“ ‘[G]eneral acceptance’ can . . . be an impor-
tant factor in ruling particular evidence admissible . . . .”).
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therefore PAS fails this factor under Daubert as well. The remainder of this
Section considers each of the remaining Daubert factors and concludes that
theories of parental alienation fail to fulfill any of these criteria.
First, as many PAS opponents have already noted, the theory has yet to
be adequately tested using recognized empirical methods.65 Since the mid-
1980s, mental health practitioners have published dozens of reports of
clinical studies that purport to diagnose PAS. These reports include a long-
term study of sixty divorced families;66 general conclusions regarding PAS
drawn from clinical observations of several hundred children;67 evaluations
of the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory-2 (“MMPI-2”) results of
allegedly alienating parents;68 and small-scale diagnostic studies based on
Gardner’s proposed symptoms.69 All these studies, however, are based on
clinical observations rather than statistically significant empirical data. As
one psychologist explains, “[W]e all have to recognize and admit that
clinical experience, including case studies, prove nothing. . . . To put the
point more formally, case studies are valuable for generating hypotheses but
not for confirming hypotheses.”70
Until recently, opponents of PAS have cited an utter lack of empirical
research as support for the inadmissibility of alienation testimony.71 As of
65. See, e.g., Jennifer Hoult, The Evidentiary Admissibility of Parental Alienation Syn-
drome: Science, Law, and Policy, Child. Legal Rts. J., Spring 2006, at 1, 10–12; Meier, supra
note 21, at 4; Walker & Shapiro, supra note 28, at 268.
66. See Judith S. Wallerstein & Joan Berlin Kelly, Surviving the Breakup: How
Children and Parents Cope with Divorce 77–80 (1980) (identifying twenty-five out of
131 children as forming “alignment” relationships with one parent against the other). Interest-
ingly, Wallerstein and Kelly also note that nearly all the children who initially formed “align-
ments” had resumed “reasonable” relationships with the target parent within five years of the
divorce. Id. at 233–34.
67. Stanley S. Clawar & Brynne V. Rivlin, Children Held Hostage: Dealing
with Programmed and Brainwashed Children app. 173, 180 tbl.17 (1991) (finding evi-
dence of programming in 80 percent of the 700 cases observed); Leona M. Kopetski, Identify-
ing Cases of Parental Alienation Syndrome—Part I, Colo. Law., Feb. 1998, at 65, 65 (finding
parental alienation dynamics in 20 percent of 413 families studied).
68. Robert M. Gordon et al., MMPI-2 Findings of Primitive Defenses in Alienating Par-
ents, 36 Am. J. Fam. Therapy 211 (2008) (comparing the results of the MMPI-2, a common
psychological assessment, to classification as an alienating or target parent); Jeffrey C. Siegel &
Joseph S. Langford, MMPI-2 Validity Scales and Suspected Parental Alienation Syndrome, Am. J.
Forensic Psychol., no. 4, 1998, at 5 (1998) (analyzing the MMPI-2 profile of parents exhibit-
ing characteristics of PAS).
69. John Dunne & Marsha Hedrick, The Parental Alienation Syndrome: An Analysis of
Sixteen Selected Cases, J. Divorce & Remarriage, no. 3–4, 1994, at 21; Kristen Carey, Explor-
ing Long-Term Outcomes of the Parental Alienation Syndrome 39 (Jan. 2003) (unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation, California School of Professional Psychology) (available through ProQuest)
(diagnosing with PAS eight out of the ten children studied).
70. Robert E. Emery, Reader Commentary, Parental Alienation Syndrome: Proponents
Bear the Burden of Proof, 43 Fam. Ct. Rev. 8, 9 (2005); see also Meier, supra note 21, at 10
(“And of course, clinical observations do not constitute empirical evidence.”).
71. E.g., Hoult, supra note 65, at 1; Meier, supra note 21, at 3.
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this publication, however, two statistical studies have attempted to empiri-
cally verify the existence of PAS. Both studies analyze the inter-rater reliabil-
ity of the proposed diagnosis—that is, the ability of practitioners to
consistently identify PAS. Although these studies may seem to provide an
avenue for proponents of PAS to lay claim to empirical support, both at-
tempts ultimately fail the Daubert standard.
Carlos Rueda published the first study in 2004.72 Rueda notes that this
work was his doctoral dissertation, which Gardner “sanctioned” and which
Dr. Warshak, another prominent PAS supporter, has cited.73 Rueda adopts
Gardner’s diagnostic criteria, and he asked survey participants to evaluate
five case scenarios and identify whether they reflected the symptoms. Out of
fifty-eight solicited participants, only fourteen completed the survey.74
Rueda claims high levels of agreement among respondents for each of the
five case scenarios regarding the presence (or absence) of PAS symptoms.75
The study fails to provide conclusive support for the reliability of diag-
nosing PAS due to several shortcomings. First, the small sample size calls
into question the probative value of the results. Second, Rueda suggests that
some of the solicited participants declined to respond either due to lack of
interest or “philosophical opposition to the concept of PAS.”76 Thus, as one
critic notes, it seems that the study “presumed rather than proved the key
question” of whether PAS is a valid diagnosis due to self-selection among the
respondents.77 Finally, although Rueda identifies agreement among partici-
pants regarding the presence or absence of PAS symptoms, he ultimately
concludes that the study “failed to firmly differentiate PAS from parental
alienation.”78 In other words, the study participants were unable to resolve
the key issue of whether one parent caused a child’s estrangement from the
other parent.
The second inter-rater reliability study is another doctoral dissertation,
this one submitted by Stephen Morrison in 2006.79 Morrison replicated
72. Carlos A. Rueda, An Inter-Rater Reliability Study of Parental Alienation Syndrome, 32
Am. J. Fam. Therapy 391 (2004).
73. Carlos A. Rueda, Curriculum Vitae, Winter Park Recovery Ctr., 1, http://your-
liferecovery.com/vitae/rueda_vitae.pdf (last visited Oct. 4, 2013); see also Divorce and Parental
Alienation Resources, Dr. Richard A. Warshak: Building Family Bridges, www.warshak.
com (last visited Oct. 4, 2013) (describing Warshak’s work in this area).
74. Rueda, supra note 72, at 393, 400.
75. Approximately 86% of respondents agreed that PAS symptoms were present in Case
1, 79% in Case 3, 71% in Case 4, and 93% in Case 5. Only 21% of respondents believed that
PAS symptoms were present in Case 2, suggesting concurrence in disagreement as well. Id. at
399.
76. Id. at 393.
77. Meier, supra note 21, at 4.
78. Rueda, supra note 72, at 399–400. Meier argues that this conclusion “essentially
negates the usefulness of the study.” Meier, supra note 21, at 4.
79. Stephen Lee Morrison, Parental Alienation Syndrome: An Inter-Rater Reliability
Study (Dec. 2006) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Southern Mississippi) (avail-
able through ProQuest).
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Rueda’s study from two years earlier, apparently at Warshak’s suggestion.80
He distributed 300 surveys and received twenty usable responses.81 Morrison
also reports high levels of agreement among respondents,82 although his
study reveals a significantly lower level of agreement than Rueda’s results on
one of the vignettes.83 Interestingly, for one case study, Rueda found that 57
percent of respondents believed that PAS was not present, whereas 60 per-
cent of the participants in Morrison’s study believed that it was.84
Morrison’s study fails to resolve the concerns raised by Rueda’s attempt
two years earlier. The Morrison study suffers from the same problem regard-
ing the probative value of such a small sample size. Morrison echoes the
concern about self-selection when he hypothesizes that the low response rate
might be due to the controversial nature of PAS.85 In fact, one solicited par-
ticipant, who happened to be the head of a university psychology depart-
ment, contacted Morrison’s institutional review board because she believed
that the project was overly ideological and “unworthy of doctoral level re-
search.”86 Finally, although Morrison does not directly address Rueda’s fail-
ure to differentiate PAS from parental alienation, he notes that his study
“revealed unresolved issues” related to the use of the term “syndrome” in
connection with theories of parental alienation.87 In summary, neither of
these inter-rater reliability studies provides the type of consistent empirical
support that courts seek under the Daubert standard.
Second, the error rate associated with diagnosing PAS remains unknown,
and it is likely unacceptably high. The Morrison and Rueda studies measure
whether psychologists can consistently identify the presence of Gardner’s
proposed PAS symptoms. The studies do not, however, measure whether
those symptoms accurately diagnose the condition. In fact, there are no pub-
lished studies that measure the error rate of diagnosing PAS. Some authors
suggest that the error rate is likely to be unacceptably high due to the nature
of Gardner’s diagnostic criteria, which do not explain how an evaluator may
distinguish between justified estrangement and intentional alienation.88 One
80. Id. at iii.
81. Id. at 112.
82. Of those who responded to each respective question, 85% identified PAS symptoms
in Case 1, 60% in Case 2, 65% in Case 3, 70% in Case 4, and 95% in Case 5. Id. at 128, 131–32,
136, 140, 144.
83. Compare Rueda, supra note 72, at 399 (revealing agreement of 79% for Case 3), with
Morrison, supra note 79, at 131–32, 136 (revealing agreement of 65% for Case 3).
84. Compare Rueda, supra note 72, at 397, with Morrison, supra note 79, at 131–32.
85. Morrison, supra note 79, at 155.
86. Id. at 192, 223.
87. Id. at 215.
88. See Hoult, supra note 65, at 9–10 (noting that Gardner’s proposed symptoms “tau-
tologically presume their diagnostic conclusion that alienation is pathological and unjusti-
fied”); Walker & Shapiro, supra note 28, at 276–78 (noting that “there is no reliable or valid
way of making these distinctions” between a child who is alienated due to intentional interfer-
ence by the other parent and a child who becomes estranged from a parent for other reasons).
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expert describes this as “the most egregious part” of the proposed PAS diag-
nosis because it is impossible to make a differential diagnosis based solely on
the child’s symptoms without reference to the behavior of one or both
parents.89
Third, and finally, the treatment of PAS in peer-reviewed publications
does not advance its reliability. Contrary to the assertions of many early PAS
critics,90 a number of articles published in peer-reviewed journals discuss the
theory. One prominent PAS proponent has compiled a list of close to 150
articles advocating the theory.91 Most of those articles appeared in peer-re-
viewed publications.92 Nevertheless, peer review contributes to the Daubert
reliability analysis only if it is itself reliable. The current canon of PAS litera-
ture thus raises two key concerns: first, it does not include the type of empir-
ical research that peer review typically validates, and second, the review
process itself is not transparent.
The purpose of the peer-review process is to assess the “scientific merit”
of research prior to publication.93 Once researchers submit an article to a
journal for consideration, the journal sends copies to reviewers with exper-
tise in the field who are charged with evaluating the methodology of the
study, the standards for analysis, and the validity of the results.94 Reviewers
may also consider whether the study has been replicated under similar cir-
cumstances with consistent results.95 This system is designed to gauge the
validity of empirical research, a type of research that is currently lacking in
the realm of PAS.96 It is arguably less suited to reliably reviewing qualitative
or anecdotal research based on clinical observations or case studies, since
89. Walker & Shapiro, supra note 28, at 276.
90. See, e.g., Rita Smith & Pamela Coukos, Fairness and Accuracy in Evaluations of Do-
mestic Violence and Child Abuse in Custody Determinations, Judges’ J., Fall 1997, at 38, 54;
Cheri L. Wood, Comment, The Parental Alienation Syndrome: A Dangerous Aura of Reliability,
27 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 1367, 1375–76 (1994).
91. References Relevant to Parental Alienation Syndrome, Richard A. Warshak: Build-
ing Family Bridges, http://www.warshak.com/alienation/pa-references/pasarticles.html (last
visited Oct. 4, 2013).
92. I verified the status for each of the American journal publications included on War-
shak’s bibliography by performing a search for each publication on Ulrich’s. UlrichsWeb,
http://www.ulrichsweb.com (last visited Oct. 4, 2013). Ulrich’s is a database that catalogs the
peer-review status (whether a publication is “refereed”) for over 300,000 periodicals. Fre-
quently Asked Questions (FAQs), UlrichsWeb, http://www.ulrichsweb.com/ulrichsweb/faqs.
asp (last visited Oct. 4, 2013). Aside from the articles in bar journals, which Ulrich’s does not
classify as peer reviewed, only three of the articles (published in Divorce Litigation, The
Medico-Legal Journal, and Justice of the Peace) were not peer reviewed.
93. Sarah H. Ramsey & Robert F. Kelly, Social Science Knowledge in Family Law Cases:
Judicial Gate-Keeping in the Daubert Era, 59 U. Miami L. Rev. 1, 73 (2004).
94. Id.
95. Id. at 74 (“As a general rule, peer reviewers and the scientific community give
greater credence to research findings that have been replicated . . . .”).
96. Rueda’s inter-rater reliability study is currently the only empirical research on PAS
published in a peer-reviewed journal. Morrison’s dissertation, although approved by his dis-
sertation committee, has not been published as of this Note’s writing. See generally supra notes
71–72, 79 and accompanying text.
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this type of research is not characterized by the factors—methodology, sta-
tistical analysis of results, and replication—that reviewers are typically sup-
posed to evaluate.
The other key issue concerns the legitimacy of peer review itself. An
ideal review panel is composed of experts with balanced viewpoints and
without financial or ideological conflicts of interest. Nonetheless, “well-re-
puted” publications maintain the anonymity of their reviewers, resulting in
a lack of transparency.97 Similarly, although standard practice holds that re-
viewers must be given a “mandate” outlining their responsibilities, the man-
dates remain confidential; the standards they establish are not publicly
available.98 Finally, even peer-reviewed publications may adopt an ideologi-
cal slant. For example, the American Journal of Family Therapy, the leading
publication for articles on PAS,99 counts over half a dozen prominent PAS
advocates among its editorial board members.100 While this certainly does
97. Hoult, supra note 65, at 12.
98. Id.
99. The journal is the most prolific source of pieces in support of PAS. See, e.g., Amy
J.L. Baker, The Long-Term Effects of Parental Alienation on Adult Children: A Qualitative Re-
search Study, 33 Am. J. Fam. Therapy 289 (2005); Amy J.L. Baker, Patterns of Parental Aliena-
tion Syndrome: A Qualitative Study of Adults Who Were Alienated from a Parent as a Child, 34
Am. J. Fam. Therapy 63 (2006); Amy J.L. Baker, The Power of Stories/Stories About Power: Why
Therapists and Clients Should Read Stories About the Parental Alienation Syndrome, 34 Am. J.
Fam. Therapy 191 (2006); William Bernet et al., Parental Alienation, DSM-V, and ICD-11, 38
Am. J. Fam. Therapy 76 (2010); Terence W. Campbell, Why Doesn’t Parental Alienation Occur
More Frequently? The Significance of Role Discrimination, 33 Am. J. Fam. Therapy 365 (2005);
Glenn F. Cartwright, Expanding the Parameters of Parental Alienation Syndrome, 21 Am. J. Fam.
Therapy 205 (1993); Douglas Darnall & Barbara F. Steinberg, Motivational Models for Sponta-
neous Reunification with the Alienated Child: Part I, 36 Am. J. Fam. Therapy 107 (2008);
Douglas Darnall & Barbara F. Steinberg, Motivational Models for Spontaneous Reunification
with the Alienated Child: Part II, 36 Am. J. Fam. Therapy 253 (2008); Elizabeth M. Ellis, Help
for the Alienated Parent, 33 Am. J. Fam. Therapy 415 (2005); Richard A. Gardner, Denial of the
Parental Alienation Syndrome Also Harms Women, 30 Am. J. Fam. Therapy 191 (2002); Gard-
ner, supra note 25; Richard A. Gardner, Does DSM-IV Have Equivalents for the Parental Aliena-
tion Syndrome (PAS) Diagnosis?, 31 Am. J. Fam. Therapy 1 (2003); Gardner, PAS vs. Parental
Alienation, supra note 7; Richard A. Gardner, The Relationship Between the Parental Alienation
Syndrome (PAS) and the False Memory Syndrome (FMS), 32 Am. J. Fam. Therapy 79 (2004);
David L. Levy, Book Review, 20 Am. J. Fam. Therapy 276 (1992) (reviewing Gardner, PAS
Guide, supra note 7); Ron Meister, Book Review, 31 Am. J. Fam. Therapy 321 (2003) (review-
ing Richard A. Gardner, Therapeutic Interventions for Children with Parental
Alienation Syndrome (2001)); Nancy Rainey Palmer, Legal Recognition of the Parental Alien-
ation Syndrome, 16 Am. J. Fam. Therapy 361 (1988); Rueda, supra note 72; Ed Spruijt et al.,
Parental Alienation Syndrome (PAS) in the Netherlands, 33 Am. J. Fam. Therapy 303 (2005);
Despina Vassiliou & Glenn F. Cartwright, The Lost Parents’ Perspective on Parental Alienation
Syndrome, 29 Am. J. Fam. Therapy 181 (2001); Richard A. Warshak, Remarriage as a Trigger of
Parental Alienation Syndrome, 28 Am. J. Fam. Therapy 229 (2000).
100. See The American Journal of Family Therapy: Editorial Board, Taylor & Francis
Online, http://www.tandfonline.com/action/aboutThisJournal?show=editorialBoard&journal
Code=uaft20 (last visited Oct. 4, 2013) (listing S. Richard Sauber (editor-in-chief), Amy Baker,
William Bernet, Barry Bricklin, Douglas Darnall, Demosthenes Lorandos, L.F. Lowenstein, and
Richard Warshak as part of the editorial board). For a sampling of PAS-related works and
resources with which these individuals are involved, see The International Handbook of
Parental Alienation Syndrome (Richard A. Gardner, S. Richard Sauber & Demosthenes
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not preclude the possibility of objective review, it does raise questions about
the methods and criteria used in accepting pieces for publication.101
This is not to suggest that peer review is irrelevant to a court’s determi-
nation of whether proffered expert testimony is reliable. Rather, judges
should take seriously the Daubert Court’s conclusion that “publication (or
lack thereof) in a peer reviewed journal thus will be a relevant, though not
dispositive, consideration” in determining the admissibility of scientific or
other technical evidence.102 In other words, peer-review status is not merely
a box for judges to check—after all, the Daubert Court explicitly noted that
it did not “presume to set out a definitive checklist” of factors for admissibil-
ity.103 Whether or not peer-reviewed publication helps courts determine the
reliability of proposed expert testimony will depend in part on the nature of
the review itself.
One can easily imagine why family court judges find expert witness tes-
timony appealing. Custody cases are inherently messy, and the stakes are
never higher than when abuse is alleged—the wrong decision could sentence
a child to years of continued torment or deny him the benefit of a loving
(though currently rejected) parent. Given the complex issues involved in
these cases, it is understandable why judges might wish to rely on the advice
of mental health professionals. Yet the law charges courts, not psychologists,
with issuing custody orders, and Daubert and Frye stand for the proposition
that judges may only call on experts to assist them in their duties if the
testimony offered by those experts is valid. As testimony regarding PAS can-
not meet that standard under either test, it has no place in the courtroom.
II. Refocusing the Dispute: The Role of the Guardian Ad Litem
Despite this Note’s conclusion that testimony about PAS should be inad-
missible, some family courts continue to issue custody orders based on PAS
and related theories.104 There are two potential explanations for this reality.
Lorandos eds., 2006) [hereinafter The International Handbook of PAS]; Amy J.L. Baker,
Adult Children of Parental Alienation Syndrome (2007); William Bernet, Parental
Alienation Disorder and DSM-V, 36 Am. J. Fam. Therapy 349 (2008); Barry Bricklin & Gail
Elliott, Psychological Test-Assisted Detection of the Parental Alienation Syndrome, in The Inter-
national Handbook of PAS, supra, at 264; Parental Alienation and Parental Alienation Syn-
drome, PsyCare, www.parentalalienation.org (last updated Oct. 30, 2012) (website run by
Douglas Darnall); Parental Alienation, www.parental-alienation.info (last visited Oct. 4,
2013) (website run by L.F. Lowenstein); and Divorce and Parental Alienation Resources, supra
note 73 (website run by Richard A. Warshak).
101. A more detailed analysis of the intricacies and controversies of the peer-review
system is beyond the scope of this Note. For a general primer on some common criticisms, see
Richard Smith, Peer Review: A Flawed Process at the Heart of Science and Journals, 99 J. Royal
Soc’y Med. 178 (2006).
102. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 594 (1993) (emphasis
added).
103. Id. at 593. This is a relevant factor for consideration during an evidentiary hearing.
In the case of alienation testimony, courts might benefit from the assistance of guardians ad
litem to provide a nonadversary evaluation of the proposed evidence. See infra Part II.
104. See cases cited supra notes 32–33.
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First, the admissibility of expert testimony is not contested in many cases.105
Second, Frye and Daubert only govern testimony of witnesses offering opin-
ions based on scientific or technical expertise. Expert witnesses may offer
testimony strongly reminiscent of PAS without uttering the word “syn-
drome,” instead relying on the more innocuous sounding but ultimately
misleading “parental alienation.”106 Similarly, lay witnesses may introduce
comparable evidence through testimony based on personal knowledge.107
Thus, even in jurisdictions that prohibit testimony based on PAS, judges still
face a perplexing dilemma: How are they to evaluate conflicting claims of
abuse and alienation when a child rejects a parent during divorce? Section
II.A argues that in the midst of a highly adversarial process, the child de-
serves independent representation to advocate for his best interests. Section
II.B suggests that a court-appointed lawyer-guardian ad litem is best suited
to fulfill this need, and it proposes a statutory framework outlining the pow-
ers and duties of that position. Section II.C anticipates potential sources of
resistance to this proposal and offers a response.
A. The Need for Independent Representation
All fifty states require custody decisions to be based on the best interests
of the child.108 Some state statutes delineate specific factors for courts to
consider, such as the capacity of each parent to provide a safe and stable
home environment, the child’s relationship with each parent, the ability of
each parent to foster a positive relationship between the child and the other
parent (often called a “friendly parent” provision), and the presence of do-
mestic violence in each parent’s home.109 But the fact remains that contested
custody cases are inherently adversarial, with each parent lobbying the judge
to adopt his or her interpretation of the child’s best interests. In the best-
case scenario, either parent would offer the child a safe and loving home,
and the parents’ dispute is the result of a good-faith disagreement; in less
ideal circumstances, the parents may use custody proceedings as a vehicle to
control or retaliate against one another, or an abusive parent may see them
as an opportunity to maintain access to her victim.
Despite the child’s role as the “party in interest,” he is not considered a
party to the custody proceeding.110 When parents’ attorneys present their
105. For example, it does not appear that the admissibility of expert testimony was
contested in any of the cases cited supra in notes 32–33.
106. See supra notes 27–32 and accompanying text.
107. See Fed. R. Evid. 602.
108. Child Welfare Info. Gateway, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Determining
the Best Interests of the Child, Child Welfare Info. Gateway, 1 (2013), https://www.child
welfare.gov/systemwide/laws_policies/statutes/best_interest.pdf.
109. Id. at 3–5; see also Am. Bar Ass’n Comm’n on Domestic & Sexual Violence, Child
Custody and Domestic Violence by State, Am. Bar Ass’n (Feb. 2008), http://www.americanbar.
org/content/dam/aba/migrated/domviol/docs/Custody.authcheckdam.pdf (noting which states
include domestic violence and friendly parent provisions in their best interests factors).
110. Elrod, supra note 5, at 526 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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cases before a judge, their duty is to provide zealous advocacy on behalf of
their clients, not the child. In fact, parents’ attorneys are not even required
to consider the child’s interests in developing their case strategies.111 Even a
loving parent’s legal and financial interests may diverge from her child’s, and
if this happens, the attorney’s duty is clear. Consequently, the adversarial
court system is not adequately protective of the child’s interests, despite the
fact that these interests are the central inquiry in disputed custody cases. The
nature of high-conflict cases involving allegations of abuse, domestic vio-
lence, or alienation reveals a dire need for independent legal representation
for the children in the midst of these disputes.
It may be difficult for a court to determine why a child rejects a parent.
The two poles of the PAS debate offer two conflicting explanations: (1) phys-
ical or sexual abuse perpetrated by the target parent or (2) brainwashing
conducted by the favored parent. Other potential factors include parental
disinterest, feelings of abandonment due to the divorce itself, insufficient
bonding prior to the divorce, and a temporary sense of detachment resulting
from a combination of the child’s personality, gender, or developmental
stage.112 The National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges
(“NCJFCJ”) recognized this dilemma and published a bench book to assist
courts in making custody determinations for families with a history of do-
mestic violence.113 It cautions that abusive parents may blame their ex-
spouses for the child’s rejection because they refuse to take responsibility for
their own behavior.114 It also observes that it is appropriate for a parent to
try to protect a child from abuse by limiting his contact with the abuser,
which makes it important for evaluators to carefully investigate each parent’s
motivation.115 Finally, the NCJFCJ notes that the opposite phenomenon is
also possible; the child may actually align with the abusive parent as a de-
fense mechanism, in an attempt to avoid suffering abuse himself.116
The NCJFCJ also offers general guidelines for dealing with allegations of
alienation. It notes that there may be competing explanations for a child’s
relationship with one of his parents, and therefore custody evaluators should
explore the basis for the child’s concerns, as well as the role each parent has
played in shaping the child’s opinion of the other.117 The NCJFCJ concludes
111. Id. at 539. Presumably a parent and her attorney will discuss the child’s interests at
some point, given that these are the facts at issue in the court’s resolution of the case. The
parent’s attorney, however, is not required to promote or even consider the child’s welfare in
developing a case strategy, including deciding whether to file motions for protective orders or
psychological evaluations, whether to call potentially hostile individuals as witnesses, and even
whether to appeal the court’s order after it is issued. Id.
112. See id. at 511–12; see also Bruch, supra note 23, at 530–31.
113. Claire Dalton et al., Nat’l Council of Juvenile & Family Court Judges,
Navigating Custody & Visitation Evaluations in Cases with Domestic Violence (rev.
ed. 2006).
114. Id. at 25.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 24–25.
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that a “careful fact-based inquiry, unlike applying the ‘PAS’ label, is likely to
yield testimony that is more accurate and relevant.”118 This recommendation
underscores the importance of providing independent representation for the
child at the center of these conflicts. A party representing the child’s, rather
than the parent’s, interests will be better able to conduct a party-neutral
investigation and provide an objective recommendation to the court based
on the child’s best interests.
B. Proposed Statutory Framework
Child welfare law already contemplates a mechanism for providing inde-
pendent representation for children involved in court proceedings: the
guardian ad litem (“GAL”), an advocate charged with representing the best
interests of the child.119 Since its enactment in 1974, the federal Child Abuse
Prevention and Treatment Act (“CAPTA”) has required states to appoint
GALs to represent children in abuse and neglect proceedings in order to
remain eligible for grant funding.120 Most states also allow for the appoint-
ment of GALs in private custody disputes, but that determination is usually
left to the judge’s discretion.121 A GAL’s identity and the scope of his repre-
sentation vary from state to state by statute. Some states require an attorney
to fill the position, whereas others permit a variety of individuals with spe-
cial training, including social workers or mental health professionals, to
serve as GALs.122 Although the call to appoint GALs in private custody cases
is certainly not new,123 this Note offers two specific proposals to refine the
existing, more general recommendation.
First, states should pass legislation mandating the appointment of GALs
in contested custody cases involving allegations of abuse, domestic violence,
or alienation. This requirement would bring the private custody system in
line with the expectations that CAPTA created in the child welfare context.
This parallel is particularly apt because high-conflict divorces often present
some of the same issues as abuse and neglect cases, as reflected by the
point–counterpoint nature of abuse and alienation allegations. Requiring
GALs would also ensure an independent perspective in the midst of a highly
118. Id. at 25.
119. See Linda D. Elrod, Child Custody Practice and Procedure § 12:7 (rev. ed.
2013).
120. 42 U.S.C. § 5106a(b)(2)(B)(xiii) (2006) (“[I]n every case involving a victim of
child abuse or neglect which results in a judicial proceeding, a guardian ad litem . . . shall be
appointed to represent the child in such proceedings . . . to obtain first-hand, a clear under-
standing of the situation and the needs of the child; and . . . to make recommendations to the
court concerning the best interests of the child . . . .”).
121. See Appointment Laws in Divorce Cases, Am. Bar Ass’n (Jan. 2007), http://www.
americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/legalservices/probono/childcustody/divorce_chart
_with_role.authcheckdam.pdf; see also, e.g., Cal. Fam. Code § 3150 (West 2013) (allowing the
appointment of counsel to represent the child’s interests in custody proceedings).
122. See Appointment Laws in Divorce Cases, supra note 121.
123. See, e.g., Elrod, supra note 5, at 525.
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adversarial process. As discussed in Section II.A, the he-said-she-said nature
of custody proceedings may impede a court’s ability to discern the child’s
true interests—which are, after all, the heart of the matter. Bringing in a
neutral party helps redefine the terms of the dispute to achieve the “careful
fact-based inquiry” advocated by the NCJFCJ.124 Finally, appointing a GAL
gives the child a voice. In a high-conflict custody battle, where the child may
feel like a pawn caught between warring parents, having his own advocate
can preserve some sense of autonomy and control during a very unsettling
experience.
Second, states should require GALs serving in custody cases to be li-
censed attorneys. Any number of professionals could conceivably serve as
GALs—psychologists, social workers, specially trained volunteers, and so
forth—and in many states, they do. But this Note envisions a particular role
for GALs in disputed custody cases, one in which the representative’s duty is
to his client (i.e., the child) rather than the court. A GAL should stand as a
full participant to the proceeding, not merely a court officer in an advisory
capacity. Based on this conception of the GAL, attorneys are better suited
than other potential candidates to cope with issues that the adversarial court
system raises. Lawyers are trained to develop factual records, craft legal theo-
ries, submit motions, present and cross-examine witnesses, and object to
inadmissible testimony or other evidence. Compared to the potential alter-
natives, they are also best equipped to handle the evidentiary issues relating
to alienation testimony raised earlier in this Note. And finally, attorneys are
advocates for their clients, a quality at the very heart of the GAL’s role.
What might this independent, legally trained GAL look like? Michigan’s
statute provides a sample framework in its lawyer-guardian ad litem (“L-
GAL”) statute.125 An L-GAL in Michigan is to serve as the “independent
representative of the child’s best interests,”126 and the law specifies that the
attorney’s “duty is to the child, and not the court.”127 This means, in part,
that attorney–client privilege attaches to the relationship, and the L-GAL
cannot be called as a witness during the proceeding.128 The L-GAL is
charged with actively participating in all aspects of the litigation,129 which in
the context of a child custody case includes all hearings and mediation ses-
sions. The L-GAL is also expected to conduct an independent investigation
into the facts of the case,130 which may include interviewing the child and his
family members, observing the home environment and the child’s interac-
tions with both parents, reviewing reports from the child’s school and any
124. See supra notes 117–118 and accompanying text.
125. Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 722.24(2) (West 2013) (allowing for the appointment
of an L-GAL in private custody cases if the court finds that the child’s interests are not ade-
quately represented); see also id. § 712A.17d (outlining the L-GAL’s duties and powers).
126. Id. § 712A.17d(1)(b).
127. Id. § 712A.17d(1).
128. Id. § 712A.17d(1)(a), (3).
129. Id. § 712A.17d(1)(b).
130. Id. § 712A.17d(1)(c).
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social workers or other mental health professionals involved, and discussing
the child’s wishes with him.131
C. Critiques and a Response
Some commentators may disagree with this Note’s recommendations.
For example, Professor Ducote advocates the elimination of GALs in private
custody cases altogether, arguing that lack of training and poorly defined
statutory responsibilities often lead GALs to thwart the very interests they
are meant to protect.132 This argument ignores the potential benefit GALs
provide when their job is “done right.” Although those who advocate re-
moving GALs from custody proceedings claim that “no laws . . . govern[ ]
[GALs], and no training course is required,”133 a Michigan L-GAL’s respon-
sibilities are clearly set forth by statute, and L-GALs are required to partici-
pate in training in child development.134 In contrast to Ducote’s conception
of GALs,135 an L-GAL in Michigan is not an expert witness, and in fact he is
prohibited from testifying regarding matters related to the case.136 Finally, a
GAL is never a substitute for a full evidentiary adjudication137—on the con-
trary, a GAL can serve a valuable function by assisting the court in develop-
ing the facts of the case and ensuring that the appropriate legal standards are
imposed.138
Ducote also suggests that GALs are prone to credit diagnoses of PAS
“despite substantial evidence of abuse,” thus causing GALs to recommend
that the child be placed in the custody of his abuser.139 The basis for this
assumption is unclear and ultimately unpersuasive. It is certainly possible
that a GAL, who under current state laws may or may not be a mental health
professional, could consider PAS a credible explanation for a child’s es-
tranged relationship with his parent—just as family court judges accept this
explanation with unfortunate frequency.140 This possibility points to the
continued need for education regarding child development, family relation-
ship dynamics, and social science testimony for professionals involved in
custody proceedings. It does not support the proposition that all GALs
131. Id. § 712A.17d(1)(c), (2). In the event that the child’s wishes differ from the L-
GAL’s evaluation of his best interests, the L-GAL must communicate this to the court. The
court may then appoint a second attorney to represent the child’s wishes, if it considers this
course of action appropriate under the circumstances. Id. § 712A.17d(2).
132. See Richard Ducote, Guardians Ad Litem in Private Custody Litigation: The Case for
Abolition, 3 Loy. J. Pub. Int. L. 106 (2002).
133. Id. at 111 (quoting Josh Gelinas, Group Calls for Oversight of Guardians, Augusta
Chron., July 20, 2001, at C2).
134. See supra notes 125–131 and accompanying text.
135. See id. at 129.
136. § 712A.17d(3).
137. See Ducote, supra note 132, at 150–51.
138. See supra notes 125–131 and accompanying text.
139. Ducote, supra note 132, at 140–42.
140. Cf. supra note 33 and accompanying text.
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should be “[d]ecommission[ed]”141 but rather highlights the importance of
independent, competent representation of the child’s best interests.
Critics may also object to the expense associated with mandating the
appointment of GALs, especially those who are attorneys.142 But this con-
cern is not fatal. Almost every state already has provisions requiring parents
to assume the cost of court-appointed representatives for their children.143 A
future legislature might conclude that it is unreasonable to expect families to
pay for a third attorney during an already costly divorce process. In that
case, the same legislature could preserve the GAL mandate while allowing
for the appointment of nonlawyer-GALs. This arrangement is not ideal for
the reasons discussed above—including the benefits conveyed through attor-
ney–client privilege, legal expertise in handling evidentiary issues, and expe-
rience in basic litigation processes—but with additional specialized training
in certain areas, nonlawyers could serve as competent and less expensive
alternatives to L-GALs.
Finally, some critics might contest the need for independent representa-
tion in the first place.144 They might argue that the court itself is already
charged with serving the best interests of the child, and judges are free to ask
court officers, such as child custody evaluators, friends of the court, or
mediators, to offer custody recommendations. Why appoint a GAL at all,
when his efforts will be duplicative? The answer lies in the specific frame-
work that this Note recommends. Under some current state statutes, which
provide that nonattorney GALs owe a duty to the court rather than the
child,145 there may be little functional difference between the role of a GAL
and that of any of the other officers of the court. But an L-GAL with a
statutorily defined duty to the child is a different animal altogether. By shift-
ing the L-GAL’s duty from the court to the client, this framework reposi-
tions the child as an equal participant in custody proceedings, rather than a
mere “party in interest” subject to secondhand representation by warring
parents or a recommendation written for the benefit of the judge rather than
the child.
141. Ducote, supra note 132, at 111.
142. Cf. id. at 149–50 (criticizing the financial burden that fees for GALs place on
parents).
143. See Appointment Laws in Divorce Cases, supra note 121 (noting that every state but
Pennsylvania includes a statutory provision for assessing fees to the parties—i.e., the parents).
144. See, e.g., Ducote, supra note 132, at 151 (“The same goals articulated in the GAL’s
raison d’etre can be obtained through . . . [the use of] family court judges . . . .”).
145. See, e.g., 750 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/506(a)(2) (2012) (providing that the responsibility
of the GAL is to offer testimony or a written report regarding the child’s best interests). In
Illinois, the role of “guardian ad litem” is crafted as an advisor to the court. See id. Illinois law
does not provide for a direct equivalent to the Michigan L-GAL, but the statutory definition of
the “child representative” is closer to the framework proposed in this Note, although the child
representative is not explicitly required to be an attorney. See id. 5/506(a)(3).
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III. GALs in Action: Sample Scenarios
This Part offers a few examples of how the proposed GAL framework
can promote the best interests of children and assist courts in resolving
high-conflict custody cases.
Scenario One: The Battle of the Experts. As discussed in Part I, high-
conflict custody cases with allegations of parental alienation may include
testimony from expert witnesses. In fact, much of the debate surrounding
the admissibility of alienation testimony boils down to a “battle of the ex-
perts,” with each parent jockeying to win the court’s approval of his or her
theory of the case. This is exactly the type of “hired gun” mentality that Frye
and Daubert sought to combat, and a tangled battle of unproven, he-said-
she-said theories ultimately does not help a court to formulate a concrete
custody order. As an objective third party, a GAL can serve two valuable
roles in these circumstances. First, he can ensure that the court admits only
admissible evidence by objecting to any testimony that does not comply
with the relevant evidentiary standards.146 And second, when the GAL
presents his case to the court, he can offer a party-neutral evaluation of the
child’s interests, and the child’s interests alone, based on his independent
investigation of the facts of the case.
Scenario Two: Evaluating Counterallegations. A GAL may also serve a
vital function in a case of point–counterpoint allegations of abuse and PAS.
As previously noted, Gardner and his supporters insist that pathological
alienation only exists in cases where the child does not have a rational reason
for rejecting a parent; in other words, if there is genuine abuse, then the case
falls outside the parameters of PAS.147 However, given that the majority of
families involved in high-conflict custody disputes report a history of child
abuse or domestic violence,148 and over 58,000 children each year are placed
in unsupervised contact with abusive parents,149 domestic violence survivors’
and children’s advocates argue that courts often ignore or undervalue this
caveat, and parties’ attorneys use false claims of PAS and parental alienation
146. Granted, the opposing party is currently free to do this as well. But given that
inadmissible testimony goes uncontested with some frequency, see supra note 105 and accom-
panying text, it certainly could not hurt to have an additional watchdog. Also, it is possible
that the GAL, as a nonadversary, may have more credibility in the eyes of the court when
making such an objection.
147. Gardner, supra note 25.
148. S.J. Dallam & J.L. Silberg, Myths That Place Children at Risk During Custody Litiga-
tion, Leadership Council on Child Abuse & Interpersonal Violence, http://www.leader-
shipcouncil.org/1/res/cust_myths.html (last visited Oct. 4, 2013).
149. Paula J. Caplan, “Parental Alienation Syndrome:” Another Alarming DSM-5 Propo-
sal, Psychol. Today (June 6, 2011) (updated July 15, 2011), http://www.psychologytoday.
com/blog/science-isnt-golden/201106/parental-alienation-syndrome-another-alarming-dsm-
5-proposal (quoting Julie R. Ancis, Parental Alienation Syndrome, Ass’n for Women Psychol-
ogy, http://awpsych.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=110&catid=74&
Itemid=126 (last visited Oct. 4, 2013)). Batterers win joint or sole custody in 70 percent of
contested custody cases. Domestic Violence & the Courtroom, Am. Judges Ass’n, http://aja.
ncsc.dni.us/domviol/page5.html (last visited Oct. 4, 2013).
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as a defense against legitimate abuse allegations.150 In these cases, the advo-
cates argue, the court’s focus shifts from the alleged child abuse or domestic
violence to the claim of PAS and the aligned parent’s behavior.151 Advocates
also argue that courts often erroneously assume that children have positive
prior relationships with both parents and that joint custody is thus in their
best interests.152
In these circumstances, a GAL can serve the same function envisioned in
CAPTA by assisting the court in conducting a thorough and independent
investigation into the facts of the case.153 This will likely include interviewing
the child, his family members, and his neighbors or teachers; observing the
dynamics of the child’s interactions with each of his parents and other fam-
ily members, such as siblings, step-parents, and step-siblings; interviewing
any mental health professionals who have evaluated the family; and review-
ing these mental health professionals’ reports. As the NCJFCJ recognizes, it
may be difficult to distinguish between cases of abuse and alienation,154 but
L-GALs—attorneys with legal expertise and special training in child devel-
opment—are best suited to assist family courts with this task.
Scenario Three: An Individualized Assessment. A child may experience
estrangement from a parent during divorce for a variety of reasons, includ-
ing abuse, neglect, personality conflicts, or a sense of resentment or aban-
donment caused by the stress of separation, and allowing adversarial parents
to represent their child’s interests by proxy may stifle the nuances of a com-
plicated situation. For example, within the same family, children may react
differently to the consequences of divorce. One child may resent a parent for
“ruining” the family by moving out, while his brother may enjoy the oppor-
tunity for one-on-one attention during visitation. If their parents attempt to
fold these divergent reactions into a single theory regarding the proper cus-
tody arrangement, they are likely to lose something in the process. Allowing
a GAL to intervene will help the court to preserve these important, individ-
ual interests. Even if the GAL represents multiple children in the same fam-
ily, he must still advocate for the particular interests of each child.
Depending on the circumstances, this could mean eliminating all visitation
for one child while supporting equal parenting time for the other—as long
as the arrangement serves each child’s individual best interests.
150. Caplan, supra note 149.
151. See Meier, supra note 24, at 688–91 (discussing the allegation–counterallegation
phenomenon and the role of demeanor in assessing competing claims).
152. See id. at 679 (“[A]pplication of ‘parental alienation syndrome’ . . . in cases with
abuse allegations, seems intrinsically to deny the likelihood that some children appropriately
want and need their exposure to fathers who abuse their mothers or themselves to be lim-
ited. . . . [J]oint legal and physical custody is frequently imposed despite mothers’ claims of
domestic violence.”).
153. See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
154. See supra notes 113–116 and accompanying text.
688 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 112:663
Conclusion
Evidence regarding a diagnosable “Parental Alienation Syndrome” or a
“Parental Alienation Disorder” distracts a court from the urgent task of
identifying and protecting a child’s best interests. Expert testimony on this
subject fails both the Frye and Daubert standards for admissibility, and the
parental rights framework that it promotes is at odds with the court’s assess-
ment of the best interests of the child. By excluding expert testimony on PAS
and appointing an independent representative of the child’s interests, courts
will enhance their ability to make custody determinations that properly ad-
dress the child’s safety, stability, and happiness.
